



The financial services industry is undergoing an
important transformation. Once separate finan-
ciallllarketsarebeihgintegrated a.nd competi-
tion is increasing among once distinct types of
financial institutions. As a result, pressure to
change our outmoded system of financial reg-
ulation is mounting. In particular, many argue
that the present legal restrictions on the activities
of banks and bank holding companies (such as
securities underwriting and placement activities)
must be reduced or eliminated to enable such
organizations to compete effectively.
At the same time, proposals to expand the
securities and other financial powers of banking
organizations threaten to diminish regulatory
control over bank risk taking - a serious con-
cern in light of the incentives to undertake risk
that our federal deposit insurance system gives
insured institutions. Most proposals that call for
expanded powers try to resolve this dilemma by
appealing to "corporate separateness." Propo-
nents of corporate separateness argue that banks
and the federal insurance funds could be insu-
lated from the risks associated with new
activities if such activities were placed in legally
separate subsidiaries of bank holding companies
and transactions between the banks and their
affiliates were restricted.
The feasibility of this approach depends crit-
ically on the answers to two questions. First, can
separation be maintained in the view ofthe law?
And second, does legal separation necessarily
lead to economic separation? This Letter argues
that although separateness is feasible legally,
alone, it is inadequate to insure effective insula-
tion of banks and the federal insurance funds
from the risk of new activities. Regulation of the
consolidated organization is needed, too.
Legal issues
The legal basis for corporate separateness rests
on the long-standing principle of limited legal
liability; the owners of corporations are not lia-
ble for the debts or actions of the corporations
they own and/or control. This principle applies
both to individuals and corporations which own
other corporations. For example, Citicorp, a cor-
porate bank holding company, is not considered
legally liable for the debts of Citibank, its
wholly-owned corporate subsidiary bank and
primary asset. Nor is Citibank considered legally
liable for the debts of Citicorp or any ofCiti-
corp's other subsidiaries.
In some cases, however, the courts have
"pierced the corporate veil" and held the
owners liable for the debts and other obligations
of a bankrupt corporation. These cases are rare
and have involved misleading representations
and actions, and/or illegal activities on the part
of the corporation. Thus, proponents of corpo-
rate separateness argue that limited liability can
be preserved by following a few basic and sens-
ible rules of business practice and by maintain-
ing corporate distinctions through the use of
separate letterheads and separate accounting
records, among other things.
Moreover, if the current legal interpretation of
limited liability is deemed to offer an inadequate
assurance of legal separation in all situations,
legislation could be passed to provide stronger
safeguards. In sum, the enforceability of limited
liability and legal separateness is not an issue of
serious dispute.
Economic incentives
Although the law does not require a corporation
to assume the obligations of an affiliate, neither
does the law preclude it from doing so. If there
are incentives for a corporation to take on the
obligations of an affiliate, it will do so. Thus,
even though a corporation and its affiliates may
be treated as separate by the law, they need not
be economically separate.
A bank holding company is a corporate veil for
the common ownership and management of
both bank and non-bank subsidiaries. The
owners of the holding company seek to maxi-
mize its value by maximizing the sum of the
values of each of the holding company's subsidi-
aries. This means that the owners will transferFRBSF
resources from one subsidiary to another when-
ever the benefits to the organization as a whole
exceed the costs to the resource-providing
subsidiary.
Incentives to transfer resources within a con-
glomerate-type organization arise because of
synergies in the production of goods and ser-
vices among its subsidiaries. For example, sev"
eral subsidiaries in a financial conglomerate
may be able to use the same information to offer
different services to a given customer. It is
cheaper for those subsidiaries to share the infor-
mation and jointly incur the expense of collect-
ing it than for each subsidiary to collect the
information.
Likewise, synergies arise in the preservation of
reputational capital. Financial troubles at one
subsidiary can affect the public's view of the
soundness of all ofits affiliates. Consequently,
the parent has an interest in transferring
resources among subsidiaries to preserve the
reputational capital of the whole organization.
As Walter Wriston, a former chairman of Citi-
corp put it, "... it is inconceivable that any
major bank would walk away from any subsidi-
ary of its holding company. If your name is on
the door, all your capital funds are going to be
behind it in the real world."
Restrictions on transactions
Proponents of corporate separateness realize
that such synergies induce bank holding com-
panies to operate in ways that do notinsulate
subsidiary banks from the risks of other subsidi-
aries. Consequently, they sugg~sUhat banks. be
insulated by restricting dividends .andother pay-
mentsto the parent and bylimitin~g banks'
investments in.sister affiIiates. Some believe that
current restrictions.on dividend payouts and the
restrictions in Sections 23Aand 23B of the
Federal Reserve Actaresuffi<::ient to insul.ate
banks.within aholdingcompany framework.
Others argue for greater restrictions on transac-
tions between a bank and its affiliates. (Section
23A lirnitsloansandassetpurchases.to anyone
affiliate to 1opercent of bank capital and limits
such transactions to all affiliates combined to 20
percent of capital. Section 23B·requires that.per-
missibJe interaffiliatetransactions be onterms
and cOl1ditions thatare substantiallythe same as
arm's length transacti9ns with nonaffiliated
firms. Current dividend payout restrictions
require prior regulatory approval for dividend
payouts that exceed current earnings.)
Proponents of corporate separateness argue that
if restrictions on interaffiIiate transactions are
enforced, it is necessary only to regulate the
bank. Consolidated regulation of the bank hold-
ing company and its nonbank subsidiaries
would not be required.
An important question remains, though, whether
such restrictions can be enforced, especially in
times of financial stress. In this regard, it is
instructive to see whether, in unregulated credit
markets, investors view legally separate subsidi-
aries as economically independent of the
strength of their parents.
Evidence from the nonbank sector
In some respects, the risks to the deposit insur-
ance system are the same as those borne by a
private long-term bondholder. Both fixed-rate
deposit insurance and long-term debt provide
incentives to increase risk and earn a higher
expected yield than would be possible ifthe
appropriate risk premiums had to be paid to the
insurer or the bondholders. The insurance guar-
antee enables bal1ks to raise funds at a risk-free
rate regardless of default risk. Once a corpora-
tion has issued long-term debt, a subsequent
increase in risk diminishes the value of the long-
term bondholders' claim.
In the same way that the bank regulators use
dividend restrictions and Sections 23A and B to
prevent banks from increasing risk, bondholders
use restrictive convenants in the bond indenture
to prevent corporations from increasing risk after
the .debt is issued. These covenants often limit
dividend payments andrestrict the extent to
which a firm can become a c1aimholder in
another. business through investments in com-
mon stock, bonds, and other extensions of
credit. Such restrictions limit the firm's abilityto
increase default risk by reducing capital or sub-
stituting higher risk assets for existing assets.
Since unregulated credit markets require such
covenants in private debt contracts, it follows
that analogous regulatory restrictions do. insulate
banks and the insurance funds to some extent.
However, it also is the case that private credit
markets do not rely solely onsuch insulation.Rather, the strength of the entire organization is
a factor in evaluating the creditworthiness of
individual subsidiaries.
Many nonbanking firms have legally separate
subsidiaries that issue debt independently of
their parent corporations. For example, General
Motors and Ford own major finance companies
(GMAC and Ford Acceptance Corp.) that issue
their own commercial paper. General Electric
Corporation also owns a large finance company,
General Electric Credit Corporation, which is
another major issuer of commercial paper. Yet
when Moody's, a private bond rating service,
evaluates the soundness ofthese subsidiaries'
debt, a prime consideration is the soundness of
the parent corporation, even though the parent
may receive a different rating than that of its
subsidiary. Apparently, investors see the fortunes
of the parent and its subsidiaries as interdepen-
dent even though they are legally separate
corporations.
An example
One example of the way the market perceives
the link between a legally separate subsidiary
and its parent is the case of MGICInvestment
Corp. and Baldwin-United Corp. Because Bald-
win-United's purchase of MGIC, a private mort-
gage insurer, increased the parent's debt burden
dramatically, the Standard & Poors debt rating
service downgraded the debt and commercial
paper ratings of both Baldwin-United and MGIC
in 1982. Moreover, in 1983, MGIC temporarily
stopped issuing commercial paper because of
unfavorable publicity over financial problems at
Baldwin-United. Apparently, Baldwin-United
had purchased MGIC to generate cash flow and
take advantage of tax credits associated with
losses in other businesses. Ultimately, Baldwin-
United declared bankruptcy, in part because the
Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner restricted
Baldwin-United's ability to upstream earnings
from MGIC.
Thus, in private credit markets, corporate sepa-
rateness apparently does not fully insulate
legally separate affiliates. Of course, it might be
possible for regulators to enforce a more strin-
gent standard. But it may not be desirable to do
so. Even cross selling and information sharing
require allocation of common expenses between
the bank and its affiliates. Similarly, for bank
holding companies to realize the benefits of fil-
ing consolidated tax returns, all the subsidiaries,
in effect, assume joint liability for taxes. With
perfect insulation, the subsidiaires become pas-
sive investments which hinder the realization of
such synergies.
Holding company regulation
Some of the proponents of corporate separate-
ness have argued that regulation of the com-
panies that own banks is not necessary.
However, a regulatory hands-off approach to
bank holding companies requires complete
insulation of banks from their affiliates and a
resultant loss of synergies among banking and
other activities. In a sense, then, we are back to
the original problem of finding a way to realize
the benefits of expanded powers without
increased risk to banks.
Here again, it is instructive to look to private
markets for guidance. Investors in unregulated
markets evaluate the financial soundness of the
parent even when they are purchasing only
GMAC or Ford Motors Acceptance Corporation
paper. Similarly, the Federal Reserve now evalu-
ates and monitors the soundness of banks and
their holding companies to determine whether
each holding company can be a source of
strength for its bank subsidiaries.
The plight of MGIC and Baldwin-United also is
instructive. The Wisconsin Insurance Commis-
sioner had the authority only to oversee MGIC,
and not its parent. As a result, his task was far
more complicated and the ultimate resolution of
the Baldwin-United bankruptcy more cumber-
some than might have been the case if the insur-
ance commissioner had had some authority to
oversee Baldwin-United.
As we have argued in previous Letters, the
powers of banking organizations can and should
be expanded, but stronger regulation, including
capital regulation, of banks and their holding
companies is needed to protect the insurance
system. Corporate separateness alone provides
some protection, but needs to be supplemented
with regulation ofthe consolidated organization.
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